Hugo Chavez and the different sources of power

Whatever you think of Chavez and his now defeated package of constitutional reforms, a few things seem clear. One, it was a disastrous mistake, reminiscent of the Charlottetown referendum in Canada, to bundle so many reforms in one package. Anyone disliking a single reform strongly enough would vote against the whole package, or stay at home, as many voters did. Two, Chavez seems to believe his own press, and to surround himself with yes-people, and this, in part, has led to overreaching, paranoia, and megalomania. When the students, who traditionally supported him, turned against him, it was a sign that he had lost his own coalition, yet he preferred to mock the students as privileged elites. Three, and perhaps most fundamentally, Chavez erred in trying to replace the informal power of mobilization and politics with formal, structural power in the constitution. Even had he won, his victory was not going to be as decisive as the margins in votes on his presidency, and any increase in formal power he might have gained would have been more than offset by a sharp loss in legitimacy and informal power, which is ultimately more decisive in achieving his programme. Then there was the risk of not winning at all, and finding himself in a diminished position on many accounts, which is the actual outcome. Chavez is badly damaged.

UPDATE: Tariq Ali has a good commentary on Chavez’s defeat.

Explore posts in the same categories: Latin America

Tags: left-wing strategy, social change, Venezuela

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